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Abstract
The central research question of this paper is how notions developed in interactive computing such
as abstract behavior types, the coordination language Reo, and Boolean circuits with registers, can
be used to extend logical input/output nets, or lions for short. Lions are based on input/output
logic, a deontic logic which is not used as a (non-classical) inference engine deriving output from
input, but as a secretarial assistant for logically assisted transformations from input to output. We
consider two extensions of input/output logics and lions. First, we consider input/output logics
deﬁned on inﬁnite sequences (or streams) of inputs and outputs. Secondly, we consider lions with
AND and register gates, formalizing the behavior of channels and connectors. We discuss also
the role of interactive computing in normative multi-agent systems motivating the development of
lions.
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1 Introduction
According to many in computer science, the interaction paradigm provides
a new conceptualization of computational phenomena that emphasize inter-
action rather than algorithms: concurrent, distributed, reactive, embedded,
component-oriented, agent-oriented and service-oriented systems all exploit
interaction as a fundamental paradigm [34,5].
In this paper we consider Makinson and van der Torre’s logical input/output
nets [25], or lions for short, as a model for interactive computation. Lions
are structured assemblies of input/output operations and extend Makinson
and van der Torre’s input/output logics [22,23]. They are graphs, with the
nodes labelled by pairs (G, out) where G is a normative code and out is an
input/output operation. The edges of the graph represent channels, which
indicate which nodes have access to which other nodes and provide passage
for the transmission of local outputs as local inputs. The graph is further
equipped with an entry point and an exit point, for global input and output.
We consider also two extensions of lions in this paper, both inspired by the
work of Arbab and colleagues on abstract behavior types [4], the coordination
language Reo [3], and Boolean circuits with registers [28].
Streams. Instead of considering one input at a time, we consider input/output
logics on inﬁnite sequences (or streams) of inputs and outputs.
Connectors. We consider AND and register gates to compose channels into
connectors (or circuits).
Finally we discuss the role of interaction in normative multi-agent systems,
and how it is used to motivate the further development of lions. Our investiga-
tions reveal a huge number of possible further extensions of lions, which raises
the question which extensions should be studied next. Input/output logic
originates from deontic logic, a branch of philosophical logic that studies log-
ical relations among obligations, permissions and prohibitions, and which has
been used to model legal and moral systems, as well as problems in computer
science that involve constraints that can be violated [35]. Whereas deontic
logic has been very helpful in the development of input/output logics, it does
not seem very helpful to guide the development of lions. A motivation of lions
comes from agent architectures and normative multi-agent systems, i.e., “sets
of agents (human or artiﬁcial) whose interactions can fruitfully be regarded as
norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should
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not behave” [21].
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we repeat the deﬁnitions
of input/output logic, and in Section 3 we explain how the concept of ‘logic
as a secretarial assistant’ is related to interactive computing. In Section 4
we discuss input/output logics of streams and register and AND gates for
channels and connectors. In Section 5 we discuss interactive computing in
normative multi-agent systems.
2 Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output logic
Makinson and van der Torre [22] argue that the new role of logic is not to
study some kind of non-classical logic, but a way of using the classical one.
From a very general perspective, logic is often seen as an ‘inference engine’,
with premises as inputs and conclusions as outputs. Instead it may be seen
in another role: as a ‘secretarial assistant’ to some other, perhaps non-logical,
transformation engine. From this point of view, the task of logic is one of
preparing inputs before they go into the machine, unpacking outputs as they
emerge and, less obviously, coordinating the two. The process is one of ‘logi-
cally assisted transformation’, and is an inference only when the central trans-
formation is so. The general perspective is one of ‘logic at work’ rather than
‘logic in isolation’. The brief description in this section is taken from Makin-
son and van der Torre’s introduction to input/output logic [25]. Please refer
to the original papers for further explanations and motivations [22,23].
2.1 Unconstrained Input/Output Operations
Imagine a black box into which we may feed propositions as input, and that
also produces propositions as output. Of course, classical consequence may
itself be seen in this way, but it is a very special case, with additional features:
inputs are themselves outputs, since any proposition classically implies itself,
and the operation is in a certain sense reversible, since contraposition is valid.
However, there are many examples of logical transformations without those
features. In [22], the outputs either express some kind of belief or expectation,
or some kind of desirable situation in the conditions given by the inputs.
Technically, a normative code is seen as a set G of conditional norms, i.e.
a set of such ordered pairs (a, x). For each such pair, the body a is thought
of as an input, representing some condition or situation, and the head x is
thought of as an output, representing what the norm tells us to be desirable,
obligatory or whatever in that situation. The task of logic is seen as a modest
one. It is not to create or determine a distinguished set of norms, but rather
to prepare information before it goes in as input to such a set G, to unpack
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output as it emerges and, if needed, coordinate the two in certain ways. A set
G of conditional norms is thus seen as a transformation device, and the task
of logic is to act as its ‘secretarial assistant’.
In the simplest kind of unconstrained input/output operations, a set A of
propositions serves as explicit input, which is prepared by being expanded to
its classical closure Cn(A). This is then passed into the ‘black box’ or ‘trans-
former’ G, which delivers the corresponding immediate output G(Cn(A)) =
{x : ∃a ∈ Cn(A), (a, x) ∈ G}. Finally, this is expanded by classical closure
again into the full output out1(G,A) = Cn(G(Cn(A))). We call this simple-
minded output. This is already an interesting operation. As desired, it does
not satisfy the principle of identity, which in this context we call through-
put, i.e. in general we do not have a ∈ out1(G, {a}), which we write brieﬂy,
dropping the parentheses, as out1(G, a).
The input/output operation out1 is characterized by three rules. Writing
x ∈ out1(G, a) as (a, x) ∈ out1(G) and dropping the right hand side as G is
held constant, these rules are:
• Strengthening Input (SI): From (a, x) to (b, x) whenever a ∈ Cn(b)
• Conjoining Output (AND): From (a, x), (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y)
• Weakening Output (WO): From (a, x) to (a, y) whenever y ∈ Cn(x).
However, simple-minded output lacks features that may be desirable in some
contexts. In the ﬁrst place, the preparation of inputs is not very sophisticated.
Consider two inputs a and b. If x ∈ Cn(a) and x ∈ Cn(b) then x ∈ Cn(a∨ b),
but if x ∈ out1(G, a) = Cn(G(Cn(a))) and x ∈ out1(G, b) = Cn(G(Cn(b)))
then we cannot conclude x ∈ out1(G, a ∨ b) = Cn(G(Cn(a ∨ b))).
In the second place, even when we do not want inputs to be automatically
carried through as outputs, we may still want outputs to be reusable as inputs
– which is quite a diﬀerent matter. Operations satisfying each of these two
features can be provided with explicit deﬁnitions, characterized by straightfor-
ward rules. We thus have four very natural systems of input/output, which are
labelled as follows: simple-minded alias out1 (as above), basic (simple-minded
plus input disjunction: out2), reusable (simple-minded plus reusability: out3),
and reusable basic (all together: out4).
The three stronger systems may also be characterized by adding one or
both of the following rules to those for simple-minded output:
• Disjoining input (OR): From (a, x), (b, x) to (a ∨ b, x)
• Cumulative transitivity (CT): From (a, x), (a ∧ x, y) to (a, y).
These four operations have four counterparts that also allow throughput. In-
tuitively, this amounts to requiring A ⊆ G(A). In terms of the deﬁnitions, it
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is to require that G is expanded to contain the diagonal, i.e. all pairs (a, a).
Derivationally, it is to allow arbitrary pairs of the form (a, a) to appear as
leaves of a derivation; this is called the zero-premise identity rule ID. All eight
systems are distinct, with one exception: basic throughput, which we write
as out+2 , authorizes reusability, so that out
+
2 = out
+
4 . This is shown by the
derivation in Figure 1, which also serves here to illustrate the proof theory
of input/output logic. In the ﬁnal step (OR) we are also implicitly using a
replacement of classically equivalent propositions (or an application of SI).
(a, x)
(a ∧ ¬x, x)
si
−
(a ∧ ¬x, a ∧ ¬x)
id
(a ∧ ¬x, x ∧ (a ∧ ¬x))
and
(a ∧ ¬x, y)
wo
(a ∧ x, y)
(a, y)
or
Fig. 1. Basic throughput authorizes reusability
2.2 Constraints
The motivation of constraints comes from the logic of conditional norms, where
we need an approach that does not presume that directives carry truth-values.
Unconstrained input/output provides us with a simple and elegant construc-
tion, with straightforward behavior, but whose application to norms totally
ignores the subtleties of violations and exceptions. Therefore input/output
operations may be subjected to consistency constraints [23]. Our strategy is
to adapt a technique that is well known in the logic of belief change - cut back
the set of norms to just below the threshold of making the current situation
contrary-to-duty. In eﬀect, we carry out a contraction on the set G of norms.
Speciﬁcally, we look at the maximal subsets G′ ⊆ G such that out(G′, A) is
consistent with input A. In [23], the family of such G′ is called the maxfamily
of (G,A), and the family of outputs out(G′, A) for G′ in the maxfamily, is
called the outfamily of (G,A). To illustrate this, consider the set of norms
G = {(,¬(f ∨ d)), (d, f ∧ w)}, where  stands for any tautology, with the
contrary-to-duty input d. Using simple-minded output, maxfamily(G, d) has
just one element {(d, f ∧w)}, and so outfamily(G, d) has one element, namely
Cn(f ∧ w).
Although the outfamily strategy is designed to deal with contrary-to-duty
norms, its application turns out to be closely related to belief revision and non-
monotonic reasoning when the underlying input/output operation authorizes
throughput. When all elements of G are of the form (, x), then for the
degenerate input/output operation out+2 (G, a) = out
+
4 (G, a), the elements of
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outfamily(G, a) are just maxichoice revisions, in the sense of belief revision as
deﬁned by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [1]. These coincide, in turn,
with the extensions of the default system of Poole [26]. More surprisingly,
there are close connections between out+3 and the default logic of Reiter [27],
see [23] for a further discussion on constraints in input/output logics and their
relation to constraints in belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning.
2.3 Permissions
Moreover, input/output logics also provide a convenient platform for distin-
guishing and analyzing several diﬀerent kinds of permission [24]. They give a
clear formal articulation of the well-known distinction between negative and
positive permission. In philosophical discussion of norms it is common to
distinguish between two kinds of permission, negative and positive. Nega-
tive permission is easy to describe: something is permitted by a code iﬀ it
is not prohibited by that code, i.e. iﬀ nihil obstat. In other words, taking
prohibition in the usual way, something is negatively permitted by a code iﬀ
there is no obligation to the contrary. From the point of view of input/output
logic, negative permission is straightforward to deﬁne: we simply put (a, x) ∈
negperm(G) iﬀ (a,¬x) ∈ out(G), where out is any one of the four input/output
operations that we have already discussed.
Positive permission is more elusive. As a ﬁrst approximation, one may
say that something is positively permitted by a code if and only if the code
explicitly presents it as such. Makinson and van der Torre distinguish what
they call forward and backward permission as two distinct kinds of positive
permission. Forward permission answers to the needs of the citizen, who
needs to know whether an action that he is entertaining is permitted in the
current situation. It also corresponds to the needs of authorities assessing
the action once it is performed. If there is some explicit permission that
covers the action in question, then it is itself implicitly permitted. On the
other hand, backward permission ﬁts the needs of the legislator, who needs to
anticipate the eﬀect of adding a prohibition to an existing corpus of norms.
If prohibiting x in condition a would commit us to forbid something that is
implicit in what has been expressly permitted, then adding the prohibition is
inadmissible under pain of incoherence, and the pair (a, x) is to that extent
protected from prohibition.
Intuitively, forperm tells us that (a, x) is permitted whenever there is some
explicitly given permission (c, z) such that when we treat it as if it were an
obligation, joining it with G and applying the output operation to the union,
then we get (a, x). Permissions are thus treated like weak obligations, the only
diﬀerence being that while the latter may be used jointly, the former may only
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be applied one by one. Backperm tells us that (a, x) is permitted whenever,
given the obligations already present in G, we can’t forbid x under the con-
dition a without thereby committing ourselves to forbid, under a condition c
that could possibly be fulﬁlled, something z that is implicit in what has been
expressly permitted.
The proof theory of the various kinds of permissions contains various un-
expected properties and proof-theoretic novelties. For example, whenever out
satisﬁes a Horn rule, then the corresponding negperm operation satisﬁes an
inverse one. Forperm and backperm are very diﬀerent operations. Whereas
forperm satisﬁes SI, backperm satisﬁes weakening of the input WI. Like nega-
tive permission, backperm satisﬁes the inverse rule of any Horn rule satisﬁed
by out; but forperm satisﬁes instead a subverse rule. See [24] for the details.
Permissions in the context of constraints have not been considered yet.
2.4 Lions
Structured assemblies of input/output operations, called logical input/output
nets, or lions for short, are graphs, with the nodes labeled by pairs (G, out)
where G is a normative code and out is an input/output operation (or re-
cursively, by other lions). The relation of the graph indicates which nodes
have access to others, providing passage for the transmission of local outputs
as local inputs. The graph is further equipped with an entry point and an
exit point, for global input and output. Lions have not been extended with
constraints or permissions yet.
3 Lions for exogenous coordination
Despite its origin in deontic logic, input/output logic is clearly related to func-
tionality descriptions of components in interactive computing. For example,
it has been shown [15] how the proof rules of input/output logic, and thus
input/output operations, are related to Treur’s functionality descriptions of
interactive reasoning components [33]. Also constraints and lions can be inter-
preted in the context of interactive computing. At this moment it is not clear
to us whether there is an analogue to permissions in interactive computing.
Moreover, the secretarial role of logic formalized by input/output logic can
be related to discussions in interactive computing. For example, Arbab [2] ar-
gues that “coordination models and languages can also be classiﬁed as either
endogenous or exogenous. [. . . ] Exogenous models and languages provide
primitives that support coordination of entities from without. In applications
that use exogenous models primitives that aﬀect the coordination of each mod-
ule are outside the module itself.” Typical examples of exogenous coordination
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are protocols enforced by the environment.
In this section we consider the proof rules of input/output logics as prop-
erties that can be enforced on the components by exogenous coordination.
In particular, it has been suggested by Makinson and van der Torre that the
identity rule corresponds to a forward loop, and that the cumulative transitiv-
ity rule corresponds to a feedback loop. We use lions to make this idea more
precise. The problem can be phrased as follows. How far can the various ways
of strengthening the input/output operation out1 to outn (n = 2,3,4) with out
without +, be simulated by integrating other familiar devices into the system
as a whole? Before we introduce the deﬁnitions, we consider two examples.
3.1 The identity rule
Consider the lion in Figure 2. This ﬁgure should be read as follows. There
are only three nodes, the start and end nodes without input/output logics
associated with them, and a single node with which a component and therefore
an input/output logic is associated. Moreover, there is an edge from the start
node to the end node.
Fig. 2. Single component with feed forward (ID)
Informally, the behavior of the lion can be deﬁned as follows, using some
of Arbab’s terminology.
• An edge between two nodes is called a channel from source to sink. The
behavior of a channel is that the input of the sink contains (at least) the
output of the source.
• When there are several channels ending in a node, then the input of this
node is the union (or logical closure) of all the inputs. So at the right hand
side of the black box in Figure 2, the output of the channel and the output
of the component are combined.
• When there are several channels leaving a node, then the node’s output is
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replicated to all channels.
For example, assume that the box in Figure 2 is described by a simple-minded
operation out1(G,A), then the output of the lion is Cn(out1(G,A)∪A), which
happens to be out+1 (G,A). So the component is exogenously (i.e., without
being aware of it or able to inﬂuence it) coordinated so that the system as a
whole behaves like a throughput operation, regardless of whether the compo-
nent itself behaves as an input/output operation or a throughput operation.
3.2 Cumulative transitivity
As a second example, we consider the more complex case of a feedback loop in
Figure 3, which leads to cumulative transitivity of the associated input/output
logic. Again there are three nodes in the lion, but this time there is a feedback
loop of the intermediate (or exit) node to the start (or intermediate) node.
Fig. 3. Single component with feedback (CT)
The lion contains a cycle, and its behavior is therefore more complicated
than the behavior of the lion in Figure 2. As usual in networks with feedback
loops, we describe the behavior of the lion using a ﬁxed point deﬁnition. The
output of the lion is the least set of formulas such that the input of the black
box contains at least its output. This is formalized in Deﬁnition 3.2 below.
For example, assume that the black box in Figure 3 can be described by
a simple-minded operation out1(G,A), and therefore the output of the lion is
∩{Cn(G(B)) | A ⊆ B = Cn(B) ⊇ G(B)}, which happens to be out3(G,A).
So the component is exogenously coordinated such that the system behaves
like a reusable output operation, regardless of the fact whether the component
itself behaves as a simple-minded or reusable operation.
To consider more complicated examples, we deﬁne lions formally based on
the above intuitions. For simplicity we do not deﬁne recursive lions. Note
that we do not require that all nodes of the lion are reachable from the start
node, though this seems a reasonable extension.
G. Boella et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 141 (2005) 135–162 143
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let L be a propositional logic. A logical input/output net or
lion is a tuple 〈N, s, e, E,G,O〉where N is a set of nodes, s, e ∈ N the start and
end node of the lion, E ⊆ N×(N \{s}) a set of edges, G : (N \{s, e}) → 2L×L
is a complete function from the set of nodes to sets of norms deﬁned over L,
and O : (N \ {s, e}) → {out1, . . . , out
+
4 } a complete function associating an
input/output operation to nodes.
The behavior of a lion is deﬁned as a least ﬁxed point, which due to
monotonicity (and the Knaster-Tarski theorem) exists and is unique.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let L be a propositional logic, A a set of formulas of L, and
〈N, s, e, E,G,O〉 a lion. Moreover, let in(n) = {m | (m,n) ∈ E} be the set of
nodes connected to n. A possible behavior of the lion is a function b : N → 2L
from the nodes to sets of propositional formulas such that:
(i) b(s) = Cn(A): A is the behavior of the start node, and
(ii) b(n) = O(n)(G(n), b(in(n))) for n ∈ N \ {s, e}, where we write b(M) =
∪m∈Mb(m) for M ⊆ N : the behavior of an internal node is deﬁned by
the associated input/output logic, and
(iii) b(e) = Cn(b(in(e))): the behavior of the end node is the union of the
outputs of the nodes connected to the end node.
Moreover, consider the case in which the black box in Figure 2 is not simple-
minded output, but reusable output out3(G,A). The behavior of the lion is
Cn(out3(G,A)∪A), which happens again to be equivalent to out
+
3 (G,A) [23].
Likewise, we consider the case in which the black box in Figure 3 is simple-
minded throughput out+1 (G,A). The output of the lion is again out
+
3 (G,A).
3.3 The disjunction rule
Whereas the identity rule and the cumulative transitivity rule are naturally
modeled as feed forward and feedback loops, this is not the case for the dis-
junction rule. In the semantics of input/output logics, this rule corresponds to
reasoning by cases. We can consider reasoning by cases as a kind of exogenous
coordination, in the sense that we can ensure that a component behaves like
it is reasoning by cases, when it is not really doing so. The idea is that in the
wrapper around the component, we need to generate the cases, and then we
collect the outputs again.
We cannot model this using lions as deﬁned above. In general, there seem
to be two ways in which this can modeled using a network, since it can be
modeled using a set of copies of the component running in parallel, or using a
single component dealing with the cases sequentially. For example, consider
G. Boella et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 141 (2005) 135–162144
the network in Figure 4 in which the logical language contains three proposi-
tional atoms p, q, r and the input of the component is p. Then there are four
cases which should be considered, q ∧ r, q ∧ ¬r, ¬q ∧ r, and ¬q ∧ ¬r.
Fig. 4. Reasoning by cases as exogenous coordination
However, a drawback of this approach is that the number of cases is un-
known and can be high or even inﬁnite. The alternative of doing the cases in
sequence uses a single component, by generating the cases one after the other,
sending them through the component, and collecting them afterwards. This
deals with the unknown number of cases, but not with an inﬁnite number.
Moreover, after each case we have to reset the component.
There are more problems related to reasoning by cases in the context of
lions. For example, if the black box in Figure 2 is not simple-minded out-
put, but basic output out2(G,A), then the behavior of the lion is weaker than
out+2 (G,A). For example, out
+
2 ({(a, x)}, ∅) = Cn(a → x), whereas the corre-
sponding lion only derives the propositional tautologies. Roughly, the reason
is that we only have feed forward for the whole lion, whereas in basic through-
put we have feed forward for each case. For example, in Figure 4 we need feed
forward from the node ‘all cases’ to the AND gate.
Due to these problems, one may be tempted to ignore the disjunction
rule. However, we would like to emphasize the importance of this reasoning
pattern in many kinds of reasoning. For example, a variant of reasoning by
cases known as the sure thing principle is a key principle in Savage’s classical
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decision theory in the foundations of statistics [29].
3.4 Combining components
As an example of a lion with multiple components, consider the simple se-
quence of two components in the BD architecture in Figure 5. This lion
represents the goal generation component of an agent architecture with a
component outputting beliefs (B) and a component outputting desires (D),
also see Section 5.1 for this interpretation.
Fig. 5. BD
If B and D are input/output operations, then also the lion is an in-
put/output operation. As David Makinson observed (personal communica-
tion), we can say quite generally the following. Take any lion L = 〈N, s, e, E,G,O〉.
Deﬁne G′ to be the set of all ordered pairs (a, x) such that x is in the output of
L (i.e. x ∈ b(e)) when L is given input a (i.e. a ∈ b(s)), Then G′ = out1(G
′).
Reason: so deﬁned, G′ is closed under SI, AND, WO.
Moreover, the properties of the lion depend on the properties of the com-
ponents. For example, when both B and D satisfy identity, then the lion
satisﬁes the identity rule. Likewise, when both B and D satisfy cumulative
transitivity, then the lion satisﬁes this rule. However, when B satisﬁes the
disjunction rule, then the lion does not have to satisfy the disjunction rule.
Moreover, consider the BD architecture with a feedback loop over both
components in Figure 6. Using the semantic Deﬁnition 3.2 we can show that
this architecture is diﬀerent from the architecture in Figure 5 when the com-
ponents do not satisfy cumulative transitivity, and they are not equivalent
either when the components satisfy cumulative transitivity.
Fig. 6. BD with feedback
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The proof theory of lions has not been studied yet, and neither the equiv-
alence of lions.
4 Extensions to lions inspired by interactive computing
There are many ways in which lions can be extended to cover a wider range
of interactive computing. In this section we consider two of those extensions
based on input/output logics for streams, and connectors.
4.1 Input/output logic for streams
In his section we are inspired by the notion of abstract behavior type (ABT),
which has been proposed by Arbab [4] as a proper foundation model of coor-
dination - more precisely, as a higher-level alternative to abstract data type
(ADT). The ABT model supports a much looser coupling than is possible
with the ADT’s operational interface. The point is that ABTs do not specify
any detail about the operations that may be used to implement such behavior
or the data types the system may manipulate for its realization - just like
input/output logic does not specify the black box. ABTs are modelled as
input/output operations on inﬁnite sequences of data, called streams, which
suggests that input/output logics should not only consider transformations at
one moment in time, but also transformations over time. In this section we
consider this extension.
4.1.1 Changing the base logic
The ﬁrst input/output logic for streams we consider replaces the propositional
base logic by a logic of streams, and then applies input/output logic on this
logic of streams. We write α for an inﬁnite sequence (called a stream) of propo-
sitions 〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉, and we deﬁne Boolean connectives as point-wise appli-
cations of the connectives. Thus ¬α = ¬〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉 = 〈¬p0,¬p1,¬p2, . . .〉.
Moreover, for binary connectives, we have 〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉 ∧ 〈q0, q1, q2, . . .〉 =
〈p0∧ q0, p1∧ q1, p2∧ q2, . . .〉, etc. Likewise, 〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉 ∈ Cn(〈q0, q1, q2, . . .〉)
if and only if pi ∈ Cn(qi) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let L be a propositional language, let α, β, γ be inﬁnite se-
quences (called streams) of elements of L, and let boolean connectives on such
streams be deﬁned as point-wise application of the connectives on elements of
the streams.
Moreover, let the norms in G be pairs {(α1, β1), . . . , (αn, βn)}, read as ‘if
input α1, then output β1’, etc., and consider the following proof rules strength-
ening of the input (SI), conjunction for the output (AND), weakening of the
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output (WO), disjunction of the input (OR), and cumulative transitivity (CT)
and Identity (Id) deﬁned as follows:
(α, γ)
(α ∧ β, γ)
SI
(α, β), (α, γ)
(α, β ∧ γ)
AND
(α, β ∧ γ)
(α, β)
WO
(α, γ), (β, γ)
(α ∨ β, γ)
OR
(α, β), (α ∧ β, γ)
(α, γ)
CT
(α, α)
Id
The following four output operators are deﬁned as closure operators on the
set G using the rules above.
out1: SI+AND+WO (simple-minded output)
out2: SI+AND+WO+OR (basic output)
out3: SI+AND+WO+CT (reusable output)
out4: SI+AND+WO+OR+CT (basic reusable output)
Moreover, the following four throughput operators are deﬁned as closure op-
erators on the set G.
out+
i
: outi+Id (throughput)
We write out(G) for any of these output operations, and out+(G) for any
of these throughput operations, we write G iol (α, β) for (α, β) ∈ out(G),
or, depending on context, (α, β) ∈ out+(G), and we write G iol G
′ iﬀ G iol
(α, β) for all (α, β) ∈ G′.
Makinson and van der Torre study only the given eight input/output op-
erations, but this set of input/output logics is not thought to be exhaustive.
For example, we believe that also operations not satisfying strengthening of
the input may be of interest, and the extension of simple-minded output with
the transitivity rule (derive (a, y) from (a, x) and (x, y)) may have some ap-
plications. In throughput systems, assuming the simple-minded rules, the
transitivity rule is equivalent to cumulative transitivity, but this is not the
case in general. Moreover, the replacement of propositional logic by a logic of
streams may again lead to the study of new inference rules. However, we do
not consider such alternatives in this paper.
In a similar way, we can generalize the deﬁnitions of constraints, permis-
sions and lions to point-wise operations on streams. For example, for two
streams α = 〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉 and β = 〈q0, q1, q2, . . .〉, we say that α and β are
conﬂicting if there is an index i such that pi ∧ qi is inconsistent. Again, the
use of streams may lead to new kinds of constraints.
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4.1.2 Stronger alternatives for the input/output logic of streams
Alternatively, we can deﬁne an input/output logic on streams as if every mo-
ment in time, the box is a traditional input/output logic, i.e.,
out(G, 〈p1, p2, p3, ...〉) = 〈out(G, p1), out(G, p2), out(G, p3), ...〉
where the ﬁrst out is deﬁned on streams as in Deﬁnition 4.1, and the second
out is a traditional input/output operation deﬁned on propositions.
For a simple example of how the two treatments of streams can give dif-
ferent outputs, consider a component which has 〈q, q,〉 amongst the outputs
of input 〈p, p,〉, and 〈r, r,〉 amongst the outputs of input 〈p, q,〉, where
 is an inﬁnite sequence of tautologies. In the input/output logic of streams
of Deﬁnition 4.1, we do not necessarily have 〈q ∧ r, q,〉 as part of the output
of input stream 〈p, p,〉. However, this is the case in the stronger alternative
deﬁned in the previous paragraph.
The second treatment always gives at least as much output as the ﬁrst,
which follows from a property of the logic of streams as we have deﬁned
it. For example, consider the conjunction rule that derives (a, p ∧ q) from
(a, p) and (a, q) at every moment in time, then we can also derive the pair
of streams (〈a〉, 〈p0 ∧ q0, p1 ∧ q1, p2 ∧ q2, . . .〉) from (〈a〉, 〈p0, p1, p2, . . .〉) and
(〈a〉, 〈q0, q1, q2, . . .〉), i.e., we can derive (α, β ∧ γ) from (α, β) and (α, γ).
As an intermediate solution, we can still deﬁne the input/output logic on
streams as an input/output operation at every moment in time, but allow for
the possibility that the set of norms is updated, i.e.,
out(〈G1, G2, G3, . . .〉, 〈p1, p2, p3, ...〉) = 〈out(G1, p1), out(G2, p2), out(G3, p3), ...〉
This leaves it open how the set of norms can be updated. For example, in the
BD architecture in Figure 5 or 6, it is left open how the sets of beliefs and
desires are updated after outputs are generated.
4.1.3 Other input/output logics of streams
Thus far, we have assumed integer time, in the sense that the input and output
streams may be seen as a function from the natural numbers to propositions.
In other words, we have implicitly assumed that there is a clock such that
every tick of the clock, a new output is generated from the input. This can
be generalized to real time by making time explicit. For example, an abstract
behavior type deﬁnes an abstract behavior as a relation among a set of timed-
data-streams. We do not further consider this extension here.
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4.2 Connectors
Thus far we have deﬁned only a single type of channel in a lion connecting
the output of a component to the input of another component. However, this
is clearly a limitation. Consider, for example, standard Boolean circuits with
AND, OR and NOT gates. How does this correspond to lions? For example,
in Figure 4 an AND gate only outputs formulas which occur in each case. So
if one channel has Cn(p ∧ q) and another channel Cn(p), then the output of
the AND gate is Cn(p). Likewise, an OR gate outputs formulae that are in
at least one of the input sets, and thus can be used to collect all inputs. Note
that under this set-theoretic interpretation, somewhat misleadingly, the logical
closure of the output of the OR gate is the consequence set of the conjunction
of its inputs. Since the input of a component collects all the outputs of the
nodes connected to it, this may implicitly be seen as an OR gate. Moreover,
a NOT gate can be deﬁned as a special kind of component. An AND gate
seems to extend the expressive power of lions.
Moreover, once we use streams, we can use more complicated channels. A
typical example is a register channel, which delays the throughput of data.
For example, a register(1) outputs its input with a delay of one clock tick.
Such a channel contains a buﬀer, with an initial value which is outputted as
the ﬁrst element of the output stream.
4.2.1 Register gates
For example, consider the lion with registers in Figure 7. We have a circuit
which splits the input, then one direct link and on via register(1). Then it
again merges with an OR port. We have the following behavior, assuming
that initially there is a tautology in the register:
out(〈p1, p2, p3, . . .〉) = Cn(〈p1, p1 ∧ p2, p2 ∧ p3, . . .〉)
Fig. 7. Connector with register
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4.2.2 AND gates
Consider now the extension of lions with AND gates, with the obvious behav-
ior. Moreover, consider the lion in Figure 8, which is the result of replacing
the OR gate in Figure 7 by an AND gate. We have the following behavior, if
initially there is a contradiction in the buﬀer:
out(〈p1, p2, p3, . . .〉) = Cn(〈p1, p1 ∨ p2, p2 ∨ p3, . . .〉)
Fig. 8. Connector with register and AND gate
4.2.3 Further extensions
Further inspiration for channels can be found in channel theory [7], based
on Dretske’s theory of information ﬂow [19], and so-called situation theory,
which originated in natural language semantics. Channel theory has studied
signalling systems, in which a series of tokens at the physical level, is inter-
preted as carrying a certain meaning at the semantic level. Dretske deﬁnes a
communication channel as “that set of existing conditions (on which the sig-
nal depends) that either (1) generate no relevant information, or (2) generate
redundant information (from the point of view of the receiver) [19, p 115]”.
In other words: the channel deﬁnes a number of background conditions that
allow communication, such as for example a shared vocabulary, but it does
not add any additional information.
Moreover, several kinds of channels have been studied in the coordination
language Reo. Some interesting extensions are the following.
• Channels generally have an input and an output end, but they can also
have two input ends, or two output ends, which can be useful to synchronize
channels.
• A new kind of gate, called a merger, will accept the input from one of the
several channels leading into it, but not all of them at the same time. In
the context of lions, such a gate may be called an exclusive choice gate.
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• Context dependent channels, for example lossy channels which lose their
inputs whenever there is no corresponding take action at the sink side of
the channel.
It is an open question which of these channels form a useful extension for
lions. As a guidance for further development of lions we propose their use in
normative multi-agent systems, which we discuss in the following section.
5 Normative multi-agent systems
In this section we discuss the relevance of interactive computing in general,
and lions in particular, for research on agent theory and normative multi-
agent systems. A pioneering approach which has inspired us is the work of
Jan Treur and colleagues, on the design of interacting reasoning components
[33]. Our discussion in this section is based on some of our own research. In
the BOID agent architecture, interaction among the various mental attitudes
like belief and desire, results in certain types of behavior. In a multi-agent
system, a kind of qualitative game theory is used to describe and analyze the
interaction among agents. In normative multi-agent systems, norms are used
to coordinate the interaction among agents. Finally, in agent communication
protocols, interaction is coordinated through social commitments.
5.1 BOID agent architecture
In the BOID agent architecture [13], the behavior of an agent is characterized
by the interaction among components that represent the mental attitudes be-
lief, obligation, intention and desire. It extends the BD architecture given in
Figure 5 and 6 with components for intentions (I) and obligations (O). The de-
sires, obligations and intentions generate the goals of the agent. Moreover, the
BOID architecture extends the BD architecture with the notion of priorities,
such that for a social agent, obligations override desires. See [14] for a logical
analysis of the interaction among mental attitudes in the BOID architecture.
A challenging issue in the formalization of the BOID architecture is the
formalization of planning in this architecture, and in particular the interaction
between goal generation and planning [18]. Goal generation is characterized
as deductive reasoning and therefore can be formalized as a lion, but plan-
ning is characterized as means-end or abductive reasoning, which is less easily
formalized as a lion. This issue has been studied using argumentation theory
in [20]. Planning has been formalized as a deductive reasoning using so-called
practical reasoning rules in the agent programming language 3APL, and an
attempt to introduce such practical reasoning rules in the BOID architecture
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is given in [17].
A second challenge is the extension of the BOID architecture with streams
of inputs and outputs. One central issue is whether mental attitudes persist
over time, an issue discussed for example by the commitment strategies in the
BDI literature.
5.2 Multi-agent systems
Interaction plays a central role in the design and analysis of multi-agent sys-
tems. In particular, the interaction is often based on game-theoretic ap-
proaches borrowed from economics and bounded reasoning as studied in arti-
ﬁcial intelligence. In these approaches, an agent itself can be seen as a black
box, with the agent’s observations as input, and the actions that constitute its
behavior as output. When an abstract behavior type characterizes a certain
type of agent behavior, it is referred to as an agent type [13].
Whereas classical game theory is based on an equilibrium analysis, theories
in artiﬁcial intelligence and agent theories are often based on the notion of
recursive modeling. Agents model other agents when making decisions, but
the number of levels in such recursive models is ﬁnite. Equilibrium analysis
can be seen as reasoning about an inﬁnite number of levels, which conﬂicts
with the idea of bounded rationality.
5.3 Normative multi-agent systems
In normative multi-agent systems, norms are used to coordinate the interac-
tion among intelligent agents. Various kinds of norms have been studied, such
as regulative norms, permissive norms, constitutive norms, social laws, etc.
Norms are modeled in terms of interaction, but the set of norms or normative
system is often modeled as a component, interacting with the agents. The
Boella-van der Torre model of normative multi-agent systems [9] is based on
a more general notion of agent than is usually understood. This model makes
it possible to attribute mental attitudes to normative systems, which means
that the normative system is itself modeled as an agent – it is called a socially
constructed agent. This has two important advantages:
(i) Obligations can be deﬁned in the BDI framework. The desires or goals of
the normative system are the obligations of the agent. This contributes to
the open problem whether norms and obligations should be represented
explicitly, for example in a deontic logic, or they can also be represented
implicitly.
(ii) The interaction between an agent and the normative system can be mod-
eled as a game between two agents. Consequently, methods and tools
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used in game theory such as equilibrium analysis can be applied to nor-
mative reasoning.
For example, a qualitative game theory can be developed as follows. The
bearer of the obligation models the decision making of the normative system,
which may itself be based on a model of the bearer of the norm. Hence the
term recursive modeling. In so called violation games, the agent bases its
decision on the consequences of the normative system’s anticipated reaction,
using a proﬁle of the system’s beliefs, desires and goals. In particular, the
agent is interested in the question whether the normative system will consider
its decision as a violation of the norm and thus sanction the agent. So called
recursive games add one level of recursion to the game. They can be used
by a legislator, to decide which norms should be created, or what the level
of sanction should be. For example, in contract negotiation games, agents
recursively model other agents to ﬁnd out whether they would obey the new
conditions and norms of the contract or not.
5.4 Norms
Regulative norms like obligations can be deﬁned as follows. If agent A is
obliged to make sure that a, then agent N may decide that the absence of a
counts as a violation of some norm n and that agent A must be sanctioned.
In particular, this means that
(i) Agent A believes that agent N desires that A does a (objective)
(ii) Agent A believes that agent N desires ¬V (n), that there is no violation of
norm n, but if agent N believes ¬a then N has the goal V (n), ¬a counts
as a violation (detection).
(iii) Agent A believes that agent N desires ¬s, not to sanction, but if agent N
decides V (n) then it has as a goal that it sanctions agent A by doing s.
Agent N only sanctions in case of violation. Moreover, agent A believes
that agent N has a way to apply the sanction (sanctioning)
(iv) Agent A desires ¬s: it does not like the sanction (deterrence)
The clauses deal with various circumstances. For example, the ﬁrst clause
expresses the objective of the norm. The second clause ensures that normative
systems will only detect actual violations. Similarly, the third clause prevents
arbitrary sanctions. The last clause shows that the sanction is undesirable,
and hence will deter agents from violating the norm.
We can deﬁne diﬀerent agent types. For example, respectful agents simply
desire to fulﬁll the norm as such, whereas for selﬁsh agents the only motivation
to comply with obligations is the fear for sanction or the desire for reward.
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Intermediate agent types are possible too. A selﬁsh agent exploits the beliefs
and goals of the normative system to try and violate an obligation without
being detected or sanctioned.
In addition to regulative norms, we stress the importance of constitutive
norms [31]. Just as the rules of chess constitute the game by deﬁning legal
moves, constitutive norms generate institutional facts, that allow individuals
to function in society. Constitutive norms take the form of ‘counts as’ rules.
For example, a theater ticket counts as evidence of the right to occupy a
seat. Constitutive norms apply only under certain circumstances and are
intimately linked to an authority or institution. Thus constitutive rules are of
the form “event or fact x counts as event or fact y under circumstances c in
institution i”.
Coordination in normative multi-agent systems [9] uses besides norms also
more complex concepts like contracts [11] and roles [10].
5.4.1 Contracts
Coordination can be achieved without requiring a ﬁxed agent architecture, but
by means of roles and norms as incentives for cooperation. For this purpose,
some approaches allow agents to stipulate contracts. A contract can be deﬁned
as a statement of intent that regulates behavior among organizations and
individuals.
Contracts have been proposed to make explicit the way agents can change
the interaction with and within the society: they create new obligations or per-
missions and new possibilities of interaction. From a contractual perspective,
an organization can be seen as the possible set of agreements for satisfying
the diverse interests of self interested individuals. In [11] we deﬁne a contract
as a triple:
(i) An institutional fact c ∈ I representing that the contract has been cre-
ated.
(ii) A constitutive rule which makes the institutional fact c true.
(iii) A set of constitutive rules having as antecedent the creation c of the con-
tract and as consequent creation actions modifying the mental attitudes
of the organization.
5.4.2 Roles
Multi-agent systems are often proposed as a solution for the organizational de-
sign of open systems. A key notion in the structure of an organization is that
of role. Roles specify the activities of an organization to achieve its overall
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goal, while abstracting from the individuals that will eventually execute them.
A role is usually described in terms of normative descriptions, expectations,
standardized patterns of behavior, social commitments, goals and planning
rules. The normative description speciﬁes the obligations that any agent who
plays the role (called the actor) should obey. Goals are his intrinsic motiva-
tions. Roles, thus, seem to be strictly related to the notion of agent: they are
described using notions like actions, goals and obligations.
In the Boella-van der Torre model, we attribute mental attitudes to roles
and use this model for several problems. First, if we design an organization in
terms of roles by attributing mental attitudes to them, we can design it just
as we would design an organization in terms of agents. However, the organi-
zation does not depend on the agents operating in it: agents are replacable.
Tasks can be delegated to roles, with a greater ﬂexibility: it would be not
suﬃcient to describe roles as machines. Second, if we consider the problem of
assigning roles to actors and we attribute mental attitudes to roles, then the
problem becomes ﬁnding a match between the beliefs representing expertise
of the role and the beliefs of the actor. Third, if we consider the governance
of organizations, then the attribution of mental attitudes to roles makes it
easier to verify whether an agent is acting according to the overall plan of the
organization: if he is acting according to the role’s beliefs and achieving the
role’s goals, then he is fulﬁlling his responsibilities.
The issue discussed in the formalization is which beliefs and goals are
attributed to a role. Not all the beliefs of the organization are beliefs of a
role due to the role assignment problem: the less beliefs are ascribed to a role,
the easier it becomes to assign agents to this role. Similarly for goals – not
all the goals of an organization are the goals of a role due to the governance
problem: to distribute responsibilities over the agents, and to control the
running system. Consequently, the organizational design aims at deﬁning
roles with minimal sets of beliefs and goals. Note that not only the beliefs
and goals of an organization may not correspond to goals of the role, but also
vice versa: a goal of a role may not be a goal of the organization.
5.5 Communication
In the communication of computer systems, interaction is regulated by a proto-
col: a set of rules that deﬁne which messages are allowed by which participants
at which stage of the interaction. Well known examples are the Contract Net
Protocol, that regulates a distributed procedure for allocating tasks, or proto-
cols for negotiation. Protocols have a normative aspect: they consist of rules
specifying what an agent should and shouldn’t do (prescription); based on
those rules other agents can form expectations about the behavior of other
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participants (prediction).
In agent theory there are at least two kinds of semantics. One is based
on the paradigm of mental attitudes. it makes speciﬁc assumptions about the
internal architecture of the agents. The other is based on social commitments,
and makes no assumptions about the agents. This approach is more in line
with the paradigm of interactive computing. In this section we discuss the
two approaches, and also propose a synthesis [8].
5.5.1 Speech act theory
Within the autonomous agents and multi-agent systems community, agent
communication standards have been developed for structuring messages and
for simple interaction protocols. The backbone of these standards is formed
by speech act theory [6,30]. The semantics of a speech act is commonly given
by the preconditions and intended eﬀect on the mental state of an agent,
expressed using modal operators for belief and intention. Early research in
AI [16] showed that the systematic analysis of speech acts in terms of pre-
conditions and postconditions could be modeled straightforwardly in terms of
planning operators. That means that a sequence of messages makes sense, in
case it can be interpreted as a plan to achieve some goal.
Various aspects of speech act theory for agents have been standardized
by an organization called FIPA, and this standardization eﬀort has been a
relative success, although it has been criticized heavily. A point of criticism
is that it is impossible to verify the correct usage of a speech act, since for
most realistic multi-agent settings the mental state of an agent is inaccessible.
Agents may well be lying. So unless a sincerity principle is postulated – which
makes no sense under common assumptions regarding multi-agent systems –
it is impossible to verify protocols [36]. What is needed instead is a semantics
that is based on public information about what agents are committed to, on
the basis of what they have said.
5.5.2 Social semantics
For this reason, Singh [32] proposes a social semantics. It is based on the
notion of commitment. Commitment binds a speaker to the community and,
unlike mental attitudes, commitments have a public character. In some cases
commitments generate a kind of obligation. For example, when a speaker as-
serts a proposition, the speaker generally becomes committed to subsequently
defending the proposition, when challenged by another dialogue participant.
These two approaches – mentalistic and social – are portrayed as competing
alternatives, but it is quite possible to combine them. The combination rests
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on the following key idea: if we attribute mental attitudes to the roles of the
participants, rather than to the individual agents that enact the roles, the
mental attitudes do get a public character, just like commitments.
Such a combination has the following advantages. On the one hand appli-
cations which take place in a restricted known cooperative environment can
re-use much of the work done on FIPA compliant agent communication. On
the other hand, stronger obligations can be added when required. In par-
ticular, in competitive or other non-cooperative circumstances, no sincerity
principle needs to be assumed. Instead an obligation to defend a publicly
attributed belief, as suggested above, must be added. However, the basic
bookkeeping and the semantics of the speech acts themselves, can remain the
same.
5.5.3 Synthesis
The method we adopt is to model dialogue as a game in which agents play
roles. Speech acts are moves in the game and their preconditions and eﬀects
refer to the mental states attributed to the roles, not to the mental states of
the agents themselves. This approach presupposes that mental attitudes can
be attributed to roles as well as to agents. Following [10,12], we describe roles
as agents with mental attitudes, albeit of a diﬀerent kind, since they are not
autonomous.
Agents playing roles in the game can aﬀect the state of the game, the
state of the roles they play and the state of the other roles. This is possible
thanks to constitutive rules. Constitutive rules explain how an utterance by a
player counts as a move in the game and how the move aﬀects the beliefs and
goals of the roles. In contrast with agents’ beliefs and goals, beliefs and goals
of roles have a public character in that the game deﬁnes them, and it also
deﬁnes how they evolve during a dialogue according to the moves played by
the agents. Moreover, since roles provide a description of expected behavior
they have a prescriptive character: the player of a role becomes committed
to the beliefs and goals of the role created during the dialogue. Finally, the
constitutive rules can describe, if necessary, how obligations are created during
the dialogue.
Since such dialogue games consist of both constitutive and regulative rules,
they can be considered as a normative multi-agent system. Just as for roles,
our view of normative systems is based on the agent metaphor: a normative
system can technically be considered as an agent to which mental attitudes
are attributed. Moreover, normative systems, like organizations, can be artic-
ulated in roles.
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5.5.4 Example
1. s: The president will win the election. inform(s, r, p)
2. r: But there is fraud, inform(r, s, q)
so the president will not win. inform(r, s, (q ⊃ ¬p))
3. s: Fraud? But why! challenge(s, r, q)
4. r: Fair enough, no fraud. retract(r, s,inform(r, s, q))
So you’re right. accept(r, s, p)
The example is explained as follows.
Turn 1: role s informs r that p. The rules of role s now state that p is a
consequence of s’s beliefs. The rules of role r state that the belief p can be
attributed to r unless r challenges s’s inform.
Turn 2: the agent playing role r challenges s’s information by means of an
argument of the form q, (q ⊃ ¬p).
Turn 3: s is risking losing the game. Unless it does something, it will get
into a contradiction, since r’s argument supports ¬p, which is in contrast
with its current beliefs (p). It has some alternatives: retracting its ﬁrst
inform or challenging r’s argument. So s decides to challenge r’s challenge
by asking for justiﬁcation (why).
Turn 4: r retracts the inform about q, thus giving up its challenge to p, and
subsequently accepts p.
This example shows that indeed utterances can be modeled as constitutive
rules, with the preconditions and postconditions of the mentalistic approach,
reinterpreted as the mental attitudes of the roles.
6 Summary
In this paper we consider logical input/output nets, or lions for short, as
models of interactive computing. Lions are based on input/output logic, a
deontic logic not used as a non-classical inference engine deriving output from
input, but as a secretarial assistant for transformations from input to output.
We present a few deﬁnitions, but no formal results.
The central research question of this paper is how notions developed in
interactive computing such as abstract behavior types, the coordination lan-
guage Reo, and Boolean circuits with registers, can be used to extend in-
put/output logics and lions. In particular, we consider two extensions of
input/output logics and lions.
First, we consider input/output logics deﬁned on inﬁnite sequences (or
streams) of inputs and outputs. The ﬁrst extension replaces the propositional
logic underlying input/output logic by a logic of streams, and the second
extension strengthens this logic by applying the input/output logic on every
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input. Yet another alternative applies an input/output operation at every
propositional input, but assumes that the set of norms can change over time.
Secondly, we consider lions with AND and register gates, formalizing the
behavior of channels and connectors. The extension illustrates how gates from
Boolean circuits can be used to extend lions, and how operators for streams
can be introduced to model behavior over time. We also observe that more
complicated channels can be introduced, such as lossy channels.
Our discussion has highlighted a number of future research directions for
lions. A proof theory for lions can be developed, constraints can be added to
lions, and permissions can be introduced to distinguish two kinds of outputs.
The introduction of time in streams introduces new possibility of studying
new proof rules of input/output logics, and the introduction of new kinds of
channels and gates introduces a variety of new conceptual and formal issues.
Given the huge number of possible extensions, we feel that we need guid-
ance to develops lions, just like the development of input/output logic has
been guided by issues in deontic logic. We are motivated to build normative
multi-agent systems on top of lions, based on the idea that interaction plays
a crucial role in normative multi-agent systems. In the agent architecture the
behavior of an agent is determined by the interaction among the mental atti-
tudes, in a multi-agent system game theory is used to describe and analyze the
interaction among agents, in normative multi-agent systems norms are used
to coordinate interactions among agents, and in communication interaction is
central in models based on social commitments.
One particular extension we believe can be guiding the further develop-
ment of lions for normative multi-agent systems is the development of value
webs, which are networks that describe the exchange of value. For example,
a value web may model the exchange of goods for money, possibly including
third parties such as shippers and banks. We suspect that when not only
information but also values are transported over channels, new issues arise.
We also believe that the research on input/output logics, lions and norma-
tive multi-agent systems can be an inspiration for the wider study of interactive
computing. In particular, we like to emphasize three issues:
Logic The use of logic as a secretarial assistant, which facilitates exogenous
coordination.
Concepts Concepts of normative multi-agent systems to study interaction
like contracts and roles.
Communication Communication based on social commitments, and its re-
lation to the mentalistic FIPA approach.
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